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1. See Claeys (2014) for an
overview of such policies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Since 2008, all major central banks have engaged
in monetary easing through conventional interest
rate cuts, and through unconventional measures,
such as asset purchases, long-maturity lending
and forward guidance about intended future mon-
etary policy actions. We call these unconventional
measures ‘ultra-loose monetary policies’ (ULMP).
Such measures have increased significantly the
size, and changed the composition of, the central
banks’ balance sheets1. The main reason for these
various unconventional policies and low interest
rates is that central banks try to set interest rates
at, or around the so-called 'natural rate' of interest,
a level consistent with low and stable inflation and
with an economy near its potential. In the last few
years, the too-low and below-target inflation, low
inflation expectations, the low level of capital util-
isation and the high level of unemployment sug-
gest that the natural rate of interest has been well
below the policy rate, which has been constrained
by the zero lower bound. 
While these various monetary easing measures are
justified from a macroeconomic perspective, and in
fact the European Central Bank should have adopted
expansionary measures much earlier (Claeys et al,
2014), they might have various side effects.
One possible concern is the impact on financial
stability. By analysing various theoretical consid-
erations and the current situation of the euro area,
we (Claeys and Darvas, 2015) concluded that the
risks to financial stability of ultra-loose monetary
policy in the euro area could be low. We argued
that monetary policy should focus on its primary
mandate of area-wide price stability, and other
policies should be deployed whenever the finan-
cial cycle deviates from the economic cycle or
when heterogeneous financial developments in
the euro area require financial tightening in some
but not all countries. These policies include micro-
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prudential supervision, macro-prudential over-
sight, fiscal policy and regulation of sectors that
pose financial stability risks, such as construction.
Another potential concern is the impact of ultra-
loose monetary policy on income and wealth dis-
tribution. Several observers, such as Cohen
(2014), Stiglitz (2015) and Acemoglu and John-
son (2012), have accused central banks of favour-
ing the rich and fuelling the increase in income
and wealth inequality. Inequality is a concern from
both social and economic perspectives (Piketty,
2014). The long-held view of economists that
there exists an inherent trade-off between effi-
ciency and equality (Okun, 1975) has recently
come into question, with inequality itself being put
forward as the potential cause of the crisis. High
levels of inequality might urge households to rely
on debt financing to maintain living standards,
which might have been an important driver of the
housing boom in the pre-crisis period in the US,
and thereby the consequent bust (Rajan, 2010;
Van Treeck, 2014). Ostry et al (2014) claim that
greater inequality could reduce the level and dura-
tion of periods of growth, while greater inequality
can also be linked with greater financial instabil-
ity (Skott, 2013; Vandemoortele, 2009). For the
euro area, Darvas and Wolff (2014) showed that
countries with greater inequality tended to have
higher household borrowing prior to the crisis,
resulting in more subdued consumption growth
during the crisis. The resulting high private debt,
high unemployment, poverty and more limited
access to education undermine long-term growth
and social and political stability.
The rise of inequality is mainly seen as a long-term
trend resulting from deep structural changes that
could be attributed to skill-biased technological
change, globalisation, demography, institutional
and political changes and in particular changes in
fiscal, educational and labour institutions (Piketty,
2014). Using the Gini coefficient and the share of
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income going to the top one percent, Figure 1
shows that income inequality  in major advanced
countries declined somewhat after the second
world war until about the 1970s, when it started
to increase in most countries. Figure 1 also shows
that there are major differences between coun-
tries. For example, Germany is more equal than
the United States or the United Kingdom. Figure A1
in the Annex reveals significant differences
between euro-area countries.
This Policy Contribution assesses the impact of
ultra-loose monetary policies on income and
wealth distribution in the euro area. Section 2
assesses the potential impacts through financial
markets, while section 3 considers the impacts
through changes in the macroeconomic situation.
Section 4 concludes. 
2 THE IMPACT OF ULTRA-LOOSE MONETARY
POLICIES ON INEQUALITY THROUGH
FINANCIAL MARKETS
2.1 The impact through asset prices
One of the main channels through which ultra-
loose monetary policies affect income and wealth
distribution is changes in asset prices. First, lower
central bank interest rates reduce the interest
rates on securities (such as government and cor-
porate bonds) and increase their prices. Second,
asset purchases result in increases in the prices
of the assets purchased, and a further fall in their
yields. Third, sellers of the assets purchased by
the central bank might purchase other securities
and thereby the prices of all kinds of assets can
increase (portfolio rebalancing effect). Fourth,
asset purchases by central banks can also
improve market functioning and liquidity, thereby
reducing liquidity premia, which can further raise
asset prices. And finally, ultra-loose monetary
policies can convince investors that interest rates
will remain low for a long period, which can affect
future corporate earnings and raise asset prices.
Empirical estimates for the United Kingdom and
United States by Joyce et al (2011), Meier (2009),
Gagnon et al (2011) and Baumeister and Benati
(2010) found significant effects of asset pur-
chases on the prices of the assets purchased, and
also on other securities not included in the pur-
chase programmes, including equity prices. How-
ever, as argued by Dobbs, Koller and Lund (2014),
the effect of asset purchases on equity prices
might not be as strong as is often reported, for
both theoretical and empirical reasons. First, a
rational investor should regard the current ultra-
low interest rate environment as temporary, and
thus should not reduce the discount rate to value
future cash flows. As Figure 5 of Claeys and Darvas
(2015) shows, P/E ratios have remained close to
their long-term average in the US, UK and euro
area, suggesting that share prices might not have
been boosted extraordinarily, but might have pri-
marily rebounded from extremely low levels.
Second, according to calculations in Dobbs et al
(2014), the implied real cost of equity, which rep-
resents the compensation investors require for
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A: Gini coefficient of income inequality
(after taxes and transfers), 1960-2013
B: Share of income going to the 1%
(before taxes and transfers), 1946-2012
Figure 1: Measures of inequality
Source (Panel A): Standardised World Income Inequality Database. Note: the Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 100, with 100
indicating complete inequality. It is a function of the surface between the Lorenz curve (which is the cumulative distribution
function of the probability distribution of income) and the line of equality. Source (Panel B): Top World Incomes Database
(http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/).
2. The Household Finance
and Consumption Statistics
(HCFS) survey by the Euro-
pean Central Bank collected
household-level data on
households’ finances and
consumption in 15 Euro-
pean countries (Belgium,
Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Cyprus, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Nether-
lands, Austria, Portugal,
Slovenia, Slovakia and Fin-
land). Data was collected in
2010 and 2011 in most
countries. Henceforth,
when we refer to the euro
area, we refer to these 15
countries only.
3. Figures 2 and 3 show
data according the net
wealth percentiles: the
figures according to income
percentiles are very similar.
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investing in equities instead of risk-free securities
such as Treasuries, has not fallen to a level that
would be expected in the context of a big boost in
equity prices. Finally, in order for the portfolio-
rebalancing channel to work, equity must be seen
by investors as a close substitute for fixed-income
assets. The authors give some reasons why this
might not be the case: high volatility in the equity
market, which should deter investment in equity,
or the retreat by US retail investors from equity
mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. Overall,
Dobbs et al estimate that, if interest rates rise to
their long-term historical average levels in five
years, low rates will have resulted in an increase in
equity prices of only about one percent. 
More generally, the effects of monetary policy on
asset prices should average out over the long
term. First, the exit from quantitative easing and
the tightening of monetary policy through interest
rate rises should have the opposite downward
effect on asset prices. Second, equity prices are
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Figure 2: Net wealth by wealth percentiles in the euro area and its four largest countries
Source: ECB HFCS (2013) Note: Net Wealth is the difference between total household assets and total household liabilities.
Total assets include real and financial assets. Euro area refers to the aggregate of the 15 countries included in the HFCS (see
footnote 2).
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Figure 3: Share of euro-area households with holdings of financial assets by wealth percentiles (%)
Source: ECB HFCS (2013). Note: Euro area refers to the aggregate of the 15 countries included in the HFCS (see footnote 2).
ultimately a function of the profitability of firms
and even though they can diverge from their fun-
damental values in the short-term, they should
not diverge permanently. While monetary policy
should boost economic activity and thereby cor-
porate profits in the short-term, the so-called ‘long-
run neutrality’ hypothesis suggests that it does
not have such an effect in the long-term.
While the above literature review suggests some
ambiguity about the extent and duration of asset
price increases after asset purchases, asset price
increases at least in the short-term can have sig-
nificant distributional consequences given that
asset holdings are very much concentrated
among the richest households. The Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) of the
European Central Bank2, shows that differences in
net wealth between the wealthy and the poor are
huge (Figure 2 and Figure A2 of the Annex)3. Figure
3 also shows that poorer households hold gener-
ally fewer financial assets except deposits.
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4. In principle, supply can
respond to increase in
demand and leave housing
prices unchanged. Yet
experience suggests that
sizeable expansions of the
construction sector used to
coincide with house price
increases, suggesting that
increased demand for
housing used to have an
impact on housing prices.
However, while current asset price increases
benefit those that have large holdings of assets
today, they also make future buyers of these
assets worse off, as they will have to purchase
them at higher prices. In general, it is older
households that tend to hold these assets and
plan to sell them in the future in order to maintain
their consumption, while younger households will
buy these assets in the future in order to save for
retirement. This will have distributional effects
across generations. 
Another important aspect is housing. By reducing
long-term yields, ULMP can also have an impact on
long-term mortgage interest rates. For example, for
the United States, Bivens (2015) reports that a
100 basis points decline in mortgage interest rates
boosts home prices by 7 percent. Similarly, the
portfolio rebalancing channel could increase the
demand for housing further4. As the cost of mort-
gages goes down, it should put some upward pres-
sure on housing prices. As can be seen in Figure 6
of Claeys and Darvas (2015), house prices have
been falling throughout the euro area since the
bursting of the bubble in 2007. There was a minor
increase in real house prices in Germany from
2010, but the level of real house prices in 2014
was still below the 2000 level. Earlier ECB mone-
tary policy measures might have prevented a
deeper fall in prices, while the more recent asset
purchases might lead to house price increases. 
As we can see from the HFCS, home ownership is
prevalent even among intermediate income and
wealth groups (see Figure 4 and Figure A4 of the
Annex). There are however some differences
between countries and whether we consider
income or wealth distributions. In most southern
euro area countries and in Slovakia even among
low-income households there is a high rate of
home ownership, whereas in Austria, France and
Germany home ownership is much more depend-
ent on income (Panel A of Figure 4 and Figure A4 of
the Annex). Since housing wealth constitutes a
significant fraction of total net wealth, especially
for low-wealth households, unsurprisingly low-
wealth households tend not to be home owners
(Panel B of Figure 4).
ULMP, by raising housing prices, will benefit all
homeowners. For households with lower incomes,
however, real estate assets represent a much
larger share of their total assets than for richer
households. Therefore it is possible that ULMP will
reduce inequality through the housing channel we
have just described. 
As with other assets, rising housing prices will
benefit current homeowners at the expense of
future buyers, who will tend to be young people.
As Figure 5 on the next page and Figure A5 of the
Annex shows, home ownership tends to be
dependent on the age of the head of the house-
hold, though in most southern euro-area countries
and in Slovakia home ownership is relatively high
even among the 16-34 age group. 
These findings are confirmed by a recent working
paper by Adam and Tzamourani (2015). Using
data from the HFCS, they show that the median
household strongly benefits from housing price
increases, while capital gains from bond-price and
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Figure 4: Home ownership by income and wealth percentiles in the euro area and its four largest
countries (%)
Source: ECB HFCS. Note: the bars indicate the % of households in each income/wealth group that own their main residence.
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equity-price increases are shared among rela-
tively few households.
2.2 The impact through interest rates
While ULMP has a positive impact on asset prices,
which benefits those who are holding them when
the measures are implemented, it also reduces
the expected returns on these assets for those
who are buying the assets at a high price. These
two effects might affect different age groups
within income and wealth groups differently. For
example, the young generation of the rich, who are
acquiring financial assets, might suffer relatively
more from the reduced income than older rich gen-
erations, who will largely benefit from the stock
effect. 
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Figure 5: Home ownership by age of the head of
the household in the euro area and its four
largest countries (% households)
Source: ECB HFCS.
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amplification of regional inequality, could be
important in the euro area, where there is signifi-
cant disparity in median LTVs in different countries
(Figure 7) and where there are differences in the
evolution of house prices too. In countries in which
LTVs are higher and house prices have fallen more
(Figure 8 and Figure A8 of the Annex), the share of
debtors facing difficulties in refinancing their
loans should be higher and they should benefit
less from the monetary policy accommodation.
The size of the effect of ULMP could therefore
depend on whether homeowners have a fixed or
variable rate mortgage, and how easy or costly it is
to remortgage. In some countries most mortgages
are fixed rate, which means that homeowners will
have to refinance in order to benefit from lower
interest rates, and refinancing can in some cases
be very costly. According to the Bank of Spain
(2009), the Research Institute for Housing Amer-
ica (2010), and the European Mortgage Federa-
tion (2012), Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany and the Netherlands mostly have fixed-
rate mortgages, while Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
mostly have variable-rate mortgages. In Italy there
is a mix of both. In the countries with dominantly
variable-rate mortgages, households with a mort-
gage would benefit automatically from lower rates,
while in countries with fixed-rate mortgages, only
households that are able to refinance would ben-
efit from the lower interest rates.  
Again, it is important to distinguish between short-
term and medium-term effects. In the short term,
low rates and ULMP can have negative effects on
net savers, but not in the medium term when inter-
est rates normalise. 
3 THE IMPACT OF ULTRA-LOOSE MONETARY
POLICIES ON INEQUALITY THROUGH THE
MACROECONOMY
Those claiming that ULMP is worsening inequality
mainly focus on the fact that unconventional mon-
etary policy works primarily by raising asset
prices, as documented in the previous section,
resulting in distributional effects in favour of those
holding assets. However, one of the most impor-
tant effects that unconventional monetary policy
might have on inequality is its potential impact on
More generally, lower interest rates are likely to
reduce the financial revenues of savers, who tend
to be rich, and benefit debtors, which tend to be
households from the middle-class to the rich.
Panels A and B of Figure 6 show that very few low-
income and poor households have mortgage debt
and while many have other debts (such as over-
drafts or credit cards), the median value of non-
mortgage debt is very small relative to mortgage
debt. However, the debt service to income ratio is
the highest for low-income households (Panel C
of Figure 6), implying that they would benefit the
most from a reduced mortgage interest rate. Coun-
try-specific data reported in Figure A6 of the Annex
underlines that this finding applies generally
across the euro area.
Another important element, emphasised by
Beraja et al (2015), is that ULMP can widen
inequality not only between income quintiles but
also between regions (or between countries in the
case of the euro area). Beraja et al (2015) show
that in the US, while in the aggregate asset pur-
chases resulted in more mortgage originations,
refinancing, cash-outs, and consequently con-
sumer spending, these effects were much
stronger in regions with lower mortgage loan-to-
value ratios (LTVs). Regions with numerous home-
owners whose house market price is below the
value of their mortgage (ie in ‘negative home
equity’), however, do not benefit as much from
these stimulative effects because it is more diffi-
cult and expensive for them to refinance their
mortgages. This effect, which could lead to the
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the general macroeconomic environment – boost-
ing GDP, raising inflation back to target and sup-
porting employment. Economic gains from these
positive developments could again be unequally
distributed, but possibly in a different direction to
the benefits accruing from asset-price increases.
Households and firms make spending and saving
decisions based on their expectations of future
income. ULMP can affect the decisions of house-
holds and firms in several ways: through a virtu-
ous cycle of higher revenues and incomes, higher
asset prices and wealth effects, higher collateral
values, and through higher expected inflation. 
Higher expected inflation will induce households
and firms to bring consumption spending forward
to protect their purchasing power. Higher house-
hold and firm spending, in a more benign borrow-
ing environment, should boost inflation and GDP
and reduce unemployment. Higher asset prices
will increase household and firm wealth, increas-
ing spending, and will increase the value of assets
that can be used as potential collateral for credit.
By increasing nominal spending, ULMP can also
have an indirect effect on equity prices, as com-
panies face more demand and increase their prof-
its, which in turn drives the more favourable
macroeconomic environment.
3.1 Academic research on the impact of ULMP
on the macroeconomy
Research on the macroeconomic impact of the
monetary policy measures implemented since
the beginning of the crisis has generally produced
consistent results: most papers find a significant
positive impact on inflation and GDP.  
In terms of empirical evidence from past asset-
purchase programmes in other major advanced
economies, Chung et al (2011) found that the
large-scale asset purchase programme by the US
Fed had significant benefits for the macroeco-
nomic situation in the US. Using an internal Fed-
eral Reserve Bank model, the authors found that
asset purchases reduced long-term interest rates
on treasuries by up to 50 basis points, while the
unemployment rate was about 1.5 percentage
points lower, GDP about 3 percentage points
higher and core inflation about 1 percentage point
higher than the counterfactual scenario without
Fed purchases.
Wu and Xia (2014) develop a so-called ‘shadow
rate’ – an interest rate that captures all the effects
of the Fed’s unconventional monetary policy, even
if the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) is constrained by
the zero lower bound. They find that the shadow
rate is a good representation of monetary policy
in the pre-crisis period, because the shadow rate
tracks the actual FFR very closely. The shadow
rate turns strongly negative as a result of policies
to ease credit and expand the Fed’s balance sheet.
Using a Factor Augmented VAR model, they con-
struct counterfactuals in which the shadow rate is
set to the zero lower bound, thus negating the
effects of unconventional monetary policy. They
find that industrial production is more than 5 per-
cent higher and unemployment 1 percent lower
than in a scenario with no unconventional policies.
Their model also predicts that forward guidance –
the policy of communicating the path of future
interest rates – was also successful. In their
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3.2 Implications for inequality
Recessions could potentially increase inequality
through two channels: (i) the composition of
income, and (ii) the differing impact on employ-
ment according to skill levels.
Since the poor rely much more heavily on wages
for their income, any change in employment
levels will affect them much more than the rich,
who accrue income through more diverse chan-
nels, such as capital gains. If ULMP is successful
in stimulating the economy, this will have net ben-
efits for the poor and low-skilled relative to the
rich, and will result in a reduction in inequality.
Furthermore, evidence from the literature shows
that the poor and low-skilled are the most likely to
lose their jobs in recessions. While Figure 9 on the
next page and Figure A9 in the Annex indicate a
structural change in the composition of employ-
ment, whereby the low-skilled employment
tended to decline and high-skilled employment
increased already before the crisis in almost every
country, during the crisis low-skilled workers
(which are at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion) suffered much more relative to higher-skilled
workers. It is interesting to highlight that employ-
ment of high-skilled workers (those with tertiary
education) continued to increase throughout the
crisis, even in countries suffering from large
increases in unemployment like Cyprus, Italy, Ire-
land, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain, while their
employment remained broadly stable in Estonia,
Latvia and Greece. 
Bitler and Hoynes (2015), using data from the
United States, show that those on lower incomes
experience much greater income cyclicality than
higher earners. Furthermore, this differential effect
of recessions on low earners was steeper in the
great recession compared to the previous 1980s
recession. Therefore, any policy that helps to pre-
vent or alleviate recessions will help to keep those
at the bottom end of the income and wealth distri-
bution in jobs and will therefore avoid a further
widening of inequality. 
The academic literature confirms that monetary
policy might in fact reduce inequality. For exam-
ple, Coibion et al (2012), taking a historical per-
model, a 1-year extension of the expected zero
lower bound period in the future reduces the
unemployment rate by 0.25 percentage points.
Kapetanios et al (2012) at the Bank of England
found that GDP was boosted by about 2 percent,
and at its peak, CPI inflation was about 4 percent-
age points higher than would otherwise have been
the case, averting a situation of outright deflation.
The authors use three different vector autoregres-
sive models, which allow for time-varying param-
eters. They construct their estimates of the effects
of QE by creating carefully designed counterfac-
tual scenarios in which there is no effect of QE on
government yields. Hence, in their model, the pri-
mary effect of QE is through lower interest rates,
and the second-order effects on output and infla-
tion happen entirely through the effect on interest
rates. 
Similarly, Baumeister and Benati (2010) found
that the compression in the long-term yield spread
has had a strong positive effect on output and
inflation in both the UK and US. They use Bayesian
time-varying parameter structural VAR, and inves-
tigate the effects in reducing yield spreads
(assuming a fixed short term rate to simulate the
zero lower bound). In the US they find that the
yield-compression seen as a result of asset pur-
chases increased growth by about 2 percent and
increased inflation by about 1 percent. Results for
Japan and the UK are quantitatively similar. It
should be noted that the Fed engaged in substan-
tial rounds of further asset purchases after this
point.
Focusing on the euro area, Lenza et al (2010) pro-
vide evidence, again using counterfactuals via a
VAR model, that the ECB’s early measures to ease
credit in the euro area helped reduce spreads in
money markets, which in turn had positive effects
on output and inflation. Darracq-Paries and De
Santis (2013) specifically focused on the ECB’s
LTROs of December 2011 and February 2012.
They found, using Bank Lending Survey (BLS)
data, that the LTROs substantially boosted euro-
area lending, and through their VAR model, that
GDP was 0.6 percentage points above its counter-
factual level by 2013, inflation about 0.2 percent-
age points higher and outstanding loans 2
percentage points higher.
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spective and not considering unconventional poli-
cies specifically, document that contractionary
monetary policy typically increases inequality,
while accommodative monetary policy reduces
inequality. Bivens (2015) argues that the view
that ULMP benefits only the rich through higher
asset prices is not correct. Although stock and
house prices rose as a result of the Fed’s policy
measures, helping people who own their home or
hold stocks, to the extent that the policies helped
maintain employment and output, the Fed's meas-
ures reduced inequality. Bivens concludes that in
the absence of the Fed's ULMP, wage growth would
have been lower and more unequal. For the UK, the
Bank of England (2012) makes a very similar case
to Bivens (2015) in a review of the effects that its
policy had on the distribution of wealth and
income, arguing that ULMP in the UK benefited var-
ious segments of society through its impact on
general economic conditions.
Yet the literature is not unanimous. For example,
Saiki and Frost (2014) conclude, using impulse
response functions from a VAR model with the Gini
coefficient included, that ULMP increased inequal-
ity in Japan. Meanwhile Philippon and Reshaf
(2009) have shown that remuneration in the
financial sector is extreme, even when one takes
into account technological progress and the skill
and education levels of employees. Therefore, to
the extent that ULMP benefited the financial
sector, it also benefited the wealthy owners and
employees of the financial sector  (Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2012).
4 CONCLUSIONS
The widening of income and wealth inequality
observed in many advanced countries in recent
decades is a long-term trend and primarily the
result of deep structural changes. Nevertheless,
there are some concerns that current ultra-loose
monetary policies (ULMP) could amplify that
trend, at least in the short- and medium-term.
Since 2008, most major central banks have imple-
mented various monetary easing measures. Given
the macroeconomic situation in advanced
economies and in the euro area in particular, these
measures were justified and in fact the European
Central Bank should have acted earlier. However,
some of these measures and the unusual length
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Figure 9: Employment (in millions) by educational attainment in the four largest euro-area
countries, 1992-2014
Source: Eurostat ‘Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 000) [lfsa_egised]’ dataset.
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of the monetary accommodation could have side
effects on income and wealth distribution:
• The impacts of ULMP through increases in
financial asset prices tend to increase inequal-
ity between the wealthy and poor, between the
young and old, and also between regions when
they have different financial structures.
Increases in the value of assets such as equi-
ties and government and corporate bonds will
tend to favour the rich who hold them in higher
proportions. Since older people tend to have
higher savings and may sell them in the future
in order to maintain their consumption, while
younger households are usually the ones that
will buy these assets in the future in order to
save for retirement, ULMP may have distribu-
tional consequences across generations. ULMP
can benefit households differently depending
on the structure of their financial assets, since
certain households could make better use of
the opportunity offered by low-interest rate bor-
rowing than others.
• The impacts of ULMP through an increase in
housing prices and a fall in interest rates tend
to decrease inequality. Housing is the main
asset of the middle class and therefore hous-
ing price increases will tend to compress the
wealth distribution. A fall in mortgage interest
rates tends to benefit low-income people, who
spend a larger share of their income on servic-
ing their debts.
• The impacts of ULMP through stimulating the
economy tend to reduce inequality. A large lit-
erature concluded that ULMP boosts inflation,
output and employment. In the absence of
ULMP, unemployment would be higher, which
would lead to higher income inequality,
because the poor and low-skilled are the most
likely to lose their jobs in recessions and
because wages are the primary source of rev-
enues for poorer and lower-income people.
The primary mandate of the European Central
Bank is to maintain price stability, and considera-
tions of inequality are not within its purview,
unless inequality should prevent the transmission
of monetary policy in some way. The ECB should
focus on its price stability mandate and thereby
support the fragile recovery now taking place in
the euro area. This is the best way for monetary
policy to contribute to the avoidance of an
increase in inequality in times of recession. Yet we
recommend the ECB to monitor the side effects of
its monetary policy measures, including the
potential distributional effects. The ECB has
detailed internal datasets which should allow a
comprehensive assessment.
The main policy question is how to tackle inequal-
ity in general, and whether governments should
design special measures in a deep recession or in
a situation in which central bank actions widen
inequality. For example, in the United States, poli-
cies such as the Housing Affordable Refinance
Programme (HARP), which helped homeowners
with negative home equity to refinance their mort-
gages, might have helped dampen the rising
inequality that resulted from the housing slump.
Fiscal and social policies are the right tools to fight
inequality. As documented by Darvas and Wolff
(2014), there are huge differences in the effi-
ciency of social redistribution systems in EU coun-
tries. For their levels of social expenditure and
personal income taxes, several southern Euro-
pean countries and Belgium achieve a much
smaller reduction in inequality than other EU
countries. Revising national tax/benefit systems
for improved efficiency, intergenerational equity
and fair burden sharing between the wealthy and
poor is the right way to fight inequality.
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ANNEX: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC DATA 
This annex shows country-specific data for all euro-area countries (whenever available) for the figures 
reported in the main text. Figure numbering in this annex corresponds to numbering in the main text, 
eg Figure A1 in the annex reports country-specific data relating to Figure 1 in the main text.  
 
Figure A1: Measures of inequality 
 
A) Gini coefficient of income inequality (after taxes and transfers), 1960-2013 
   
 
Source: Standardised World Income Inequality Database 
Note: The Gini coefficient ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating complete inequality. It is a function of the surface between the Lorenz curve (which is 
the cumulative distribution function of the probability distribution of income) and the line of equality. 
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B) Share of income going to the 1% (before taxes and transfers), 1946-2012 
  
Source: Top World Incomes Database (http://topincomes.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/) 
Note: series for Finland contains break that merges two different data sources 
 
 
Figure A2: Net wealth by wealth percentiles  
 
Source: ECB HFCS (2013) 
Note: Net Wealth is the difference between total household assets and total household liabilities. Total assets include real 
and financial assets 
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Figure A3: Home ownership across income percentiles (percent) 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: the bars indicate the percent of households in the income group owning their main residence. 
 
 
Figure A4: Home ownership across wealth percentiles (percent) 
 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: the bars indicate the percent of households in the wealth group owning their main residence. 
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Figure A5: Home ownership by age of the head of the household  
 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: the bars indicate the percent of households in the age group owning their main residence. 
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Figure A6: Debt and debt service 
 
A) Share of households with mortgage debt, by income (% of households) 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: Data on Finland not available 
 
B) Share of households with other debt, by income (% of households) 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: other debt denotes all debt other than mortgage debt. Data on Finland not available 
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C) Median value of mortgage debt among those who have mortgage debt, by income (€ thousands) 
 
  
Euro 
Area Austria Belgium Cyprus France Germany Greece 
Bottom 
20% 43   45 84 28 44 32 
20-40% 47 21 67 69 39 29 36 
40-60% 55 33 63 81 47 78 33 
60-80% 67 39 76 110 57 69 50 
80-90% 86 36 86 89 56 92 49 
90-100% 100 67 69 131 91 116 46 
  Italy Lux'bourg Malta N'lands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain 
Bottom 
20% 38     99 38     47 
20-40% 50 133   79 55 23   50 
40-60% 50 114   131 41 27   57 
60-80% 60 114 55 131 43 25   58 
80-90% 70 149   156 65     89 
90-100% 75 240   160 65 18   83 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: Data on Finland not available. Empty cells indicate missing data. 
 
D) Median value of other debt among those who have other debt, by income (€ thousands) 
 
  
Euro 
Area Austria Belgium Cyprus France Germany Greece 
Bottom 
20% 3 3 2 6 2 2 4 
20-40% 3 1 3 6 4 2 4 
40-60% 5 2 5 8 5 4 5 
60-80% 6 3 7 13 7 4 5 
80-90% 6 3 8 11 8 4 4 
90-100% 8 6 8 19 12 5 4 
  Italy Lux'bourg Malta N'lands Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Spain 
Bottom 
20% 5 6   10 3 0   4 
20-40% 4 9 3 10 2 1   5 
40-60% 6 12 4 12 2 2 3 6 
60-80% 7 11 5 16 4 1 5 8 
80-90% 5 19 8 32 4 1   10 
90-100% 8 16 6 18 6 3   13 
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E) Debt service as a share of household income (%) 
 
 
Source: ECB HFCS 
Note: other debt denotes all debt other than mortgage debt. Data on Finland is not available. 
 
 
Figure A8: House Price Growth (annual percent change) 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters EIKON and Datastream 
Note: All countries with available data are shown 
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Figure A9: Employment by educational attainment (thousand people), 1992-2014  
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Source: Eurostat “Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 000) [lfsa_egised]” dataset. 
